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Abstract—Achieving security against adversaries with unlim-
ited computational power is of great interest in a communication
scenario. Since polar codes are capacity achieving codes with low
encoding-decoding complexity and they can approach perfect
secrecy rates for binary-input degraded wiretap channels in
symmetric settings, they are investigated extensively in the
literature recently. In this paper, a polar coding scheme to
achieve secrecy capacity in non-symmetric binary input channels
is proposed. The proposed scheme satisfies security and reliability
conditions. The wiretap channel is assumed to be stochastically
degraded with respect to the legitimate channel and message
distribution is uniform. The information set is sent over channels
that are good for Bob and bad for Eve. Random bits are sent
over channels that are good for both Bob and Eve. A frozen
vector is chosen randomly and is sent over channels bad for
both. We prove that there exists a frozen vector for which the
coding scheme satisfies reliability and security conditions and
approaches the secrecy capacity. We further empirically show
that in the proposed scheme for non-symmetric binary-input
discrete memoryless channels, the equivocation rate achieves its
upper bound in the whole capacity-equivocation region.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cryptosystem is information-theoretically secure if it has
no information leakage. It means that Eve with unlimited com-
putational power could not break the system. An encryption
protocol in which information-theoretic security is considered
is not vulnerable to developments in computational power.
An example of an information-theoretically secure system
is the one-time pad. Information-theoretically secure commu-
nication was introduced in 1949 by Shannon. He proved that
one-time pad cryptosystem is secure [1].
An encryption algorithm is perfectly secure if its output
cipher-text provides no information about the plain-text when
the key is not known. If E is a perfectly secure encryption
function, for any fixed message M there must exist at least
one key for each cipher-text c, such that c = Ek(M). It has
been proven that any encryption algorithm with perfect secrecy
must use keys similar to one-time pad keys [1].
There are a wide variety of cryptographic tasks that imple-
ment information-theoretic security as a useful and meaningful
concept. Some of them are mentioned below:
• Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm is information-
theoretically secure, which splits the secret into pieces
and gives each piece to a specific person. To regenerate
the secret at least a portion of pieces is required, other-
wise, reconstruction of the secret is impossible.
• Quantum cryptography is a very important part of
information-theoretic cryptography.
A weaker notion of security named physical layer encryp-
tion defined by Wyner established a large area of research. It
uses the physical channel for its security by signal processing
and coding techniques. This notion of security is provable,
unbreakable, and quantifiable.
Wyner’s initial physical layer encryption work assumes that
Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob without Eve being
able to decode it. It was shown that if the channel from Alice
to Bob is statistically better than the channel from Alice to
Eve, secure communication is possible [2]. As Alice tries to
transmit messages to Bob through a communication channel,
her transmissions may reach the adversary Eve through another
the wiretap channel.
Encoder maps k-bit message M to codeword X and sends it
on the channel. Bob receives Y on the main channel Wm, while
on the wiretap channel Ww Eve receives Z. Decoder maps Y
to Mˆ . A reliable and secure system should be achieved when
message length tends to infinity.
Reliability : lim
k→∞
Pr(M 6= Mˆ) = 0 (1)
Security is defined with the normalized mutual information
between M and Z:
Weak Security : lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z)
k
= 0 (2)
Secrecy must assures that Z does not provide sufficient infor-
mation about M. Maurer in [3], [4] proves the weakness of
conventional notion of security (Eq. 2). Maurer defined strong
security condition in [3]:
Strong Security : lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z) = 0 (3)
Both weak and strong security conditions are information-
theoretic and not computational for which there is no limitation
for computational power of adversary. Hence, Computational
complexity of algorithm does not affect the security of the
system.
A. Prior Works
In 1975, Wyner considered the special setting where both
Wm and Ww are discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) and
Ww is degraded with respect to Wm and characterized such a
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2system by Cs which is called the secrecy capacity: For ∀ε > 0,
there exists a coding scheme with information rate R > Cs−ε
that simultaneously satisfies both (1) and (2). On the other
hand, at rates higher than Cs [2] both (1) and (2) cannot be
satisfied.
Since 1975, Wyner’s works have been applied and gen-
eralized to a wide variety of other research efforts such as
Gaussian channels [5], broadcast channels [6], and channels
by considering constraints on the computational power of the
adversary [7], [8]. However, a large number of these works are
based on non-constructive coding that only demonstrate the
existence of a coding scheme that achieves secrecy capacity
without proposing specific encoding-decoding schemes. The
concept of mutual entropy has also been implemented in a
large amount of research efforts such as [9], [10].
To the best of our knowledge, research efforts that propose
encoding-decoding algorithms exist only for two special cases.
The first is having a noiseless main channel and the adversary
channel is binary erasure channel (BEC). LDPC codes for the
BEC, are presented in [11] and [12] and achieve secrecy capac-
ity. The other case is when the Eve has limited computational
power. This case has been investigated by Ozarow and Wyner
in [8].
B. Assumptions and Settings
In this paper, a coding scheme that is proposed that achieves
the secrecy capacity. The assumption is that Wm and Ww
are binary-input non-symmetric DMCs and Ww is degraded
with respect to Wm. Conditions of (1) and (2) could be
satisfied using an encoding/decoding algorithms by polar with
the computational complexity of O(NlogN). Our construction
is inspired by the studies in polar codes recently investigated
by Arkan [13].
It is proved in [13] that polar codes can achieve the capacity
of binary-input DMCs with low coding complexity. This proof
is based on channel polarization. Arikan in [13] considered
the channels observed by each of the individual bits during
transformation. The channels seen by individual bits are called
bit-channels. It is shown in [13] that by increasing the block
length the bit-channels become either noiseless channels or
the complete noisy ones. The bit-channels related to noiseless
channels are called good channels and the other ones are called
bad channels. The key result of [13] is that the portion of good
channels becomes the capacity of W while N goes to infinity.
The main idea of our construction is as follows: The random
bits will be transmitted over bit-channels which are good for
both Bob and Eve. Message bits are transmitted over the bit-
channels which are bad for Eve but good for Bob, and finally,
a fixed vector is sent over bit-channels that are bad for all the
parties. We prove that there exists a sequence of frozen vector
that our coding scheme satisfies the reliability and security
condition.
Organization
In Section II, we represent relevant concepts related to
wiretap channels to provide a representation of the secrecy
capacity in the setting where Wm and Ww are DMC and Ww
is degraded with respect to Wm. Also, the notion of symmetric
channels and secrecy capacity are defined. Section III is
devoted to polar codes and theorems necessary for our proofs.
We represent The proposed coding scheme in Section IV and
we prove the security and reliability of proposed scheme. We
also prove that the code rate approaches to secrecy capacity. In
Section V, we prove that the equivocation rate for proposed
coding scheme approaches to its upper bound in the whole
capacity-equivocation region. In section VI the simulation
results are presented. Simulation results show that equivo-
cation rate achieves its upper bound in the whole capacity-
equivocation region.
Notations
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters, the
samples by the corresponding lower case letters. Calligraphic
font represents the alphabet set of related random variable.
|X | is the alphabet size. Notation AN is vector A of length
N. PX is the distribution of X. If f(x) and g(x) are defined
on a subset of real numbers then f(x) = O(g(x)), if for large
x there exists a constant number M for which the inequality
f(x) ≤M(g(x)) holds. aN1 is vector (a1, a2, ..., aN ) and nota-
tion aA represents the sub vector (ai : i ∈ A). CW represents
the capacity of the channel W:
C = max
PX
I(X;Y ). (4)
IW is the symmetric capacity of the channel W and for general
channels, it is defined as:
I(W ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
1
|X |W (y|x) log
W (y|x)
1
|X |
∑
x′∈X
W (y|x′) (5)
This is the maximum achievable rate when all channel inputs
x are used with the same probability. If the maximizing
distribution PX in (5) is the uniform distribution, then the
symmetric capacity is equal to the capacity. log(.) is based on
2 in the rest of the paper.
C. Related works
The works by Hof and Shamai [14] and Mahdavifar and
Vardy [15] assume binary-input channels for the symmetric
settings. In this work, we assume non-symmetric binary-
input channels. Work in [15] considers only achieving secrecy
capacity, but we prove that the proposed scheme for non-
symmetric setting achieves all capacity-equivocation region.
In [15] there is no assumption on the distribution of message
for proving security condition which is a fair assumption on
message M. But we consider uniform distribution since it is the
necessary condition for approaching secrecy capacity. In [16]
the non-binary setting is investigated. However, no experi-
mental results are presented. In this work, we also present
simulation results of equivocation at Eve (using randomly
chosen frozen vector) in BECs which measures the secrecy.
3II. SYMMETRIC CONCEPT AND SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section we review the works in [6] and [17] to
provide the notion of the secrecy capacity Cs. Our discussion
is limited to the binary discrete memoryless channels with
finite input-output alphabet size. Such channel is a triple
(X ,Y,W (y|x)) in which X and Y are finite input-output
alphabet of channel and W is a |X |× |Y| matrix with W (y|x)
as entries. W (y|x) is the probability of observing y ∈ Y if
x ∈ X is sent.
A matrix W is symmetric if the rows and columns of W
are permutations of each other, respectively. A channel |X | ×
|Y| is symmetric if W is a symmetric matrix. Following [13]
and [17], W is weakly symmetric if the columns of W can be
split into parts such that each part forms a symmetric matrix.
For channel Wb with input alphabet Y the wiretapper’s
channel is stochastically degraded with respect to the main
channel, if it holds the following equation:
Ww(z|x) =
∑
y′∈Y
Wm(y
′|x)Wb(z|y′)∀x, z (6)
If the channel transition probability factorizes as:
W (y, z|x) =W (y|x)W (z|y) , (7)
the wiretapper’s channel is called physically degraded with re-
spect to the main channel. Since the capacity-equivocation re-
gion only depends on the marginal probabilities, the capacity-
equivocation region for physically degraded and stochastically
degraded wiretap channels is the [6] :
U
PXPYZ|X

(R,Re) :
0 ≤ R ≤ I (X;Y)
0 ≤ Re ≤ R
Re ≤ I (X;Y)− I (X; Z)
(8)
in which Re is equivocation rate and define by 1NH(M |Z)
when N goes to infinity. In this case, the secrecy capacity is:
Cs = max
PX
{I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)} (9)
If the wiretap channel is physically degraded to main channel
then X → Y → Z and I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y ). In this case if
the same input distribution PX maximizes both I(X;Z) and
I(X;Y ), for instance when both Wm and Ww are symmetric
channels, the capacity-equivocation region is given by:
Re ≤ R ≤ CWm , 0 ≤ Re ≤ CWm − CWw (10)
If W is nonsymmetric, CWm and CWw are equal to IWm and
IWw . The secrecy capacity is:
Cs = CWm − CWw (11)
for the rest of the paper, degraded means stochastically de-
graded.
III. POLAR CODING
In this section important notions of polar coding are defined
which are used in our designs and proofs.
A. Primitive Definitions
Consider a binary-input discrete memoryless channel (B-
DMC) given by W (y|x) where x ∈ X = {0, 1}, y ∈ Y for
finite set Y . The N uses of W is denoted by WN (yN1 |xN1 ).
The symmetric capacity of a B-DMC is given by:
I(W ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
1
2
W (y|x) log 2×W (y|x)
W (y|0) +W (y|1) (12)
that is a special case of (5). The W Bhattacharyya parameter
is given by:
Z (W ) =
∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1) (13)
which measures the reliability of W since it is an upper bound
on the probability of ML decision error on a single use of the
channel.
Polar coding is introduced by Arikan [13]. The channel po-
larization phenomenon is used to construct codes that achieve
the symmetric capacity I(W ) for B-DMC W with encoding
and decoding complexity that scales as O(NlogN) with the
block length . Channel polarization consists of two operations:
channel combining and channel splitting. Let uN1 be the vector
that supposed to be formed. The combined channel WN is
represented by :
WN (y
N
1 |uN1 ) =WN (yN1 |uN1 BNF⊗N ) (14)
Let F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
, and let F⊗n denote the n-th Kronecker
power of F. Let W be arbitrary-input DMC, and the vector
U = (U1, U2, ..., UN ) be a block of N = 2n bits chosen uni-
formly at random. Suppose U is encoded as X = URNF⊗n,
where RN is the bit-reversal permutation matrix. X is sent
through N independent identical W.
The channel splitting phase constructs N binary-input chan-
nels from WN , where the transformation is given by:
W
(i)
N (y
N
1 , u
i−1
1 |ui) ≡
∑
uNi+1∈XN−i
1
2N−1
WN (y
N
1 |uN1 ) (15)
Polar coding utilizes the polarization effect. It transmits
data through the bitchannels for which Z(W (i)N ) is close to
0. In [13] the polar code (N,K,A, uAc) for B-DMC W is
defined by xN1 = u
N
1 BNF
⊗n where uAc is a given frozen
vector and the information set A is chosen such that |A| = K
and Z(W (i)N ) < Z(W
(j)
N ) for all i ∈ A, j ∈ Ac. The frozen
vector uAc is given to the decoder. Successive cancellation
(SC) decoder estimates the input as follows:for the frozen
indices uAc = uˆAc . For the remaining indices satisfying
i ∈ A;uˆi = 0, if W (i)N (yN1 , uˆi−11 |0) ≥W (i)N (yN1 , uˆi−11 |1) and
uˆi = 1, otherwise.
B. Polar coding ensemble
According to polar coding, having a set of channels between
encoder and decoder and sending information set on the good
channels, is a coding scheme. Inputs to the other channels
remain fix and are declared to the decoder. As the fraction of
good channels is I(W ), the rate of I(W ) is achievable.
4Mutual information I(Ui;Y N1 , U
i−1
1 ) corresponds to decod-
ing Ui with respect to the knowledge of U i−11 and output Y
N
1 .
In this case decoder should have the knowledge of U i−11 for
decoding Ui. However, the decoder only knows Uj where j
belongs to the indices of bad channels so for the other indices
decoder should use the estimate Uˆj , which could be incorrect.
Successive cancellation decoder,decodes bits in clean order
U1, ..., UN . For the moment polar code notation is represented
which is used for defining polar coding ensemble and the rest
of the paper.
Definition 3.1 (Polar Coding [13]): Polar code
P(N,A, uF ) for every A ⊆ {1, ..., N} and uF ∈ X |F|
is a linear code according to the following notation:
P(N,A, uF ) = {xN1 = uN1 GN : uFc ∈ X |F
c|} (16)
Code P(N,A, uF ) is constructed using a fixed vector uF
with indices set F and choosing from all possible vectors in
indices Fc or A. Notations P(N,A, uF ) and P(N,A, uAc)
are equivalent. F is frozen set and its indices are called forzen
indices. Also A is information set and its indices are called
information indices. Using code P(N,A, uAc) is corresponds
to sending UN1 on channel WN with a fixed uF on the indices
F .
Definition 3.2 (Polar Coding Ensemble [18]): Polar code
Ensemble P(N,A) for every A ⊆ {1, ..., N} represents the
Ensemble below:
P(N,A) = {P(N,A, uF ) : ∀uF ∈ X |F|} (17)
PB,e(A, uF ) represents the error probability of code block
P(N,A, uF ) with uniform distribution assumption on all
codewords. PB,e(A) is the average block error probability
of ensemble P(N,A) which is averaging PB,e(A, uF ) on all
possible choices of uF ∈ X |F| with equal probability.
Lemma 3.1 (Average Block Error Probability Upper
Bound [18]): For a B-DMC W and information set A, average
block error probability over all possible choices of frozen bits
can be bounded as follows:
PB,e(A) ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(W
(i)
N ) (18)
C. Rate of polarization and achieving symmetric capacity
Theorem 3.1 (Rate of Convergence [13]):for any B-DMC
W for N = 2n and δ ∈ (0, 1) :
lim
N→∞
|i ∈ {1, ..., N} : I(W (i)N ) ∈ (1− δ, 1)|
N
= I(W ) (19)
lim
N→∞
|i ∈ {1, ..., N} : I(W (i)N ) ∈ (0, δ)|
N
= 1− I(W ) (20)
in order to derive the rate of channel polarization the random
process Zn defined in [13] and [19]:
Pr{Zn ∈ (a, b)} = |i ∈ {1, ..., N} : Z(W
(i)
2n ) ∈ (a, b)|
2n
(21)
Theorem 3.2 (Polarization rate [19], Theorem.1): For any
B-DMC W and 0 < β < 1/2, lim
n→∞Pr{Zn < 2
−2nβ} =
I(W ).
Theorem 3.3 ([19], Theorem.2): For any B-DMC W in
which I(W ) > 0 and R < I(W ), parameter β ∈ (0, 1/2) is
considered to be fixed. Block error probability of polar coding
averaged over all possible choices of frozen bits satisfy the
following equality:
PB,e(A) = O(2−Nβ ) (22)
A lemma from [18] is used for realizing good channels and
bad channels from each other.
Lemma 3.2 ([18], Lemma 4.7): If W : X → Y and Wd :
X → Yd are two B-DMC W and Wd is degraded with respect
to W then there exists a channel like Wb : Y → Yd that
Wd(yd|x) =
∑
y∈Y
W (y|x)Wb(yd|y). In this condition Wd(i)N is
degraded with respect to W (i)N and Z(Wd
(i)
N ) ≥ Z(W (i)N ).
This lemma implies that with assumption of degradation of
wiretap channel with respect to main channel if a channel is
good to Eve, it is good for Bob. Conversely if a channel is
bad for Bob, it is bad for Eve too.
D. Nested polar code
We consider binary polar codes of block length N = 2n.
Let A and B be two index sets such that B ⊂ A ⊂ {1, ..., N}.
Nested structure of polar codes comes from the cosets of
a smaller subcodes. Consider the polar codes P(N,A, uAc)
and P(N,B, [s, uAc ]). Here [s, uAc ] is a binary vector whose
elements are equal to vector s for the indices i in A\B, and
otherwise they equal the corresponding elements in uAc . Ac
is a frozen set for both codes, but Bc is frozen only for
P(N,B, [s, uAc ]).
Definition 3.3 (Nested Polar Code [20]): Let GN be the
generator matrix of polar code and let GN (I) be the submatrix
composed of the rows of GN whose indices belong to the
set I . The nested polar code P(N,A,B, uAc) is the set of
codewords xN of the following form:
xN = uBGN (B)⊕ uA\BGN (A\B)⊕ uAcGN (Ac) (23)
The rate of the sub-codes P(N,B, [uA\B, uAc ]) equal |B|N , and
the rate of the overall code P(N,A, uAc) equals |A|N .
IV. CODING SCHEME FOR ACHIEVING SECRECY
CAPACITY
In this section we represent a coding scheme and prove its
security and reliability . Also we show that it achieves the rate
of secrecy capacity.
A. Secret Codebook
A discrete memoryless wiretap channel is denoted by fol-
lowing notation:
(X ,W (y, z|x),Y × Z) (24)
finite sets X ,Y and Z are input alphabet, main channel and
wiretap channel alphabet in the corresponding order. The
channel is assumed to be memoryless and time-invariant:
W (yi, zi|xi1, yi−11 , zi−11 ) =W (yi, zi|xi) (25)
5Figure 1. Main channel and wiretap channel indices.
Assume that the transmitter has a confidential message M
which is to be transmitted to the receiver and to be hidden
from the Eve. The secret codebook is defined as below:
1) secret message M. The transmitted messages are as-
sumed to be uniformly distributed over message setM.
2) encoding function encod(.) at the transmitter which
maps the secret messages to the transmitted symbols:
for each m ∈M encod : m→ xN1
3) Decoding function decod(.) at receiver which maps
the received symbols to estimate of the message:
decod(yN1 ) = mˆ
Reliability is measured by block error probability:
Pe =
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
Pr{decod(yN1 ) 6= m|m is sent) (26)
Security is measured by the mutual information leakage rate
to the eavesdropper:
1
N
I(M ;ZN1 ) (27)
The rate R is called achievable secrecy rate, if for any given
ε > 0, there exists a secret codebook such that:
Rate :
1
N
log(|M|) = R (28)
Reliability : PB,e(Am) ≤ ε (29)
Security :
1
N
log(M ;ZN1 ) ≤ ε (30)
Wiretap channel is degraded with respect to the main channel.
Relation between the input and output of the main and wiretap
channels depicted as following Markov chain: U → X →
(Y,Z)
For sufficiently large N and 0 < β < 1/2 following sets are
defined:
Am = {i ∈ {1, ..., N} : Z(Wm(i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β} (31)
Aw = {i ∈ {1, ..., N} : Z(Ww(i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β} (32)
According to the defined sets, Am is the good channel indices
for the main channel and Aw corresponds to the good channel
indices for the wiretap channel. Considering the polar coding
definition and lemma 3.2 it is concluded that Fm ⊆ Fw,Aw ⊆
Am. We consider nested polar code P(N,Am,Aw, uFm)
defined in Section IV.D. The main objective is to form uN1
based on defined indices sets. uN1 is the vector that multiplied
by generator matrix and forms transmitted codeword. Figure.1
demonstrates the relation between defined indices.
B. Encoding Algorithm
Secret message is mapped on the vector Vm and random
vector Vr is generated with uniformly random distribution.
The vector uN1 is formed as below:
1) Information bits are sent over the indices which are good
for the main channel and bad for the wiretap channel.
This concept could be shown by uAm\Aw = uFw\Fm =
Vm message length is k and |Vm| = |Am| − |Aw| = k.
Message distribution is uniform and therefore log |M| =
k.
2) We send random bits over indices that belong to good
channel for both main and wiretap channels as uAw =
Vr.
3) Over bad channels for both (uFm ), we send a frozen
vector assumed to be chosen from all possible choices
uFm ∈ X |Fm| and given to decoder of Bob and Eve.
Coding scheme is built over ∀uFm ∈ X |Fm| and we
should prove that there exists a specific frozen vector
like uFm for which our coding scheme satisfies the reli-
ability and security condition and additionally achieves
the secrecy capacity.
C. Decoding
Decoding should satisfy reliability and coding rate.
1) Reliability: Vm and Vr are defined over good indices
of main channel, thus according to theorem 3.3, both could
be decoded using SC decoding with probability of error
PB,e(Am) = O(2−Nβ ) (averaging over all possible choices
of uFm ). Therefore, the reliability condition is satisfied.
2) Rate: Message distribution is uniformly at random. That
leads to log |M| = |Vm| = k, consequently for sufficiently
large N:
R =
|Vm|
N
=
|Am| − |Aw|
N
= I(Wm)− I(Ww) = Cs (33)
Thus, the coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity.
D. Security Proof
Since the scheme is formed over all possible choices of
frozen bits (polar coding ensemble), mutual information be-
tween message and Eve evaluated using one random chosen
vector uFm over the whole set uFm ∈ X |Fm|. After choosing
uFm , we fix it and ultimately we prove that there exists such
uFm . The decoding error probability of Eve has been evaluated
over the ensemble in average sense.
I(M ;ZN1 |UFm) = I(Vm;ZN1 |UFm) (34)
= I(Vm, Vr;Z
N
1 |UFm)− I(Vr;ZN1 |Vm, UFm) (35)
= I(UN1 ;Z
N
1 )− I(Vr;ZN1 |Vm, UFm) (36)
= I(UN1 ;Z
N
1 )−H(Vr) +H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) (37)
≤ I(XN1 ;ZN1 )−H(Vr) +H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) (38)
≤ NI(Ww)− |Aw|+H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) (39)
6Equation (35) is concluded from the chain rule of mutual
information and (36) is a consequence of the following:
I(UN1 ;Z
N
1 ) = I(UVm∪Vr∪UFm ;Z
N
1 )
= I(Vm, Vr, UFm ;Z
N
1 )
= I(UFm ;Z
N
1 ) + I(Vm, Vr;Z
N
1 |UFm)
= I(Vm, Vr;Z
N
1 |UFm)
(40)
The last equality in (40) is derived from I(UFm ;Z
N
1 ) being
equal to zero, since uFm is sent over bad channels for both
main and wiretap channels. Equation (37) follows form the
independence of Vr, Vm, and UFm . (38) comes from data
processing inequality: M → U → X → (Y,Z). Below
inequalities lead to (39):
I(XN1 ;Z
N
1 ) = H(Z
N
1 )−H(ZN1 |XN1 )
= H(ZN1 )−
N∑
i=1
H(Zi|Xi)
≤∑ (H(Zi)−H(Zi|Xi)) = N∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi) ≤ NI(Ww)
(41)
According to (39) to find an upper bound for I(M ;ZN1 |UFm),
an upper bound for H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) should be found.
Lemma 4.1: For a nonsymmetric binary-input channel the
ensemble of polar code was defined which means defining po-
lar code over all possible choices of frozen bits. For proposed
coding scheme defined over the ensemble there exists a frozen
vector uFm , which satisfies the following inequality:
H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 )/N ≤ ε (42)
Proof. we define the following error event:
E =
{
1 Vˆr 6= Vr
0 Vˆr = Vr
(43)
Random vector is sent over good channels for both main
channel and wiretap channel. Therefore, Pe = PB,e(Aw) and:
Pe = P (E = 1) = Pr(Vˆr 6= Vr)
≤ ∑
i∈Aw
Z(Ww
(i)
N ) ≤ 2−N
β (44)
Since coding scheme is defined over all possible choices of
uFm ∈ X |Fm| and the error probability in average sense is
smaller than its upper bound, there exists a specific frozen
vector uFm which is in set X |Fm|. By choosing it, the error
probability does not exceed the upper bound 2−N
β
. The term
H(E, Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) is expanded in two ways:
H(E, Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) =
H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) +H(E|Vr, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) =
H(Vr|E, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) +H(E|Vm, UFm , ZN1 )
(45)
H(E|Vr, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) equals zero, and consequently:
H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) =
H(Vr|E, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) +H(E|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) (46)
≤ H(Vr|E, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) +H(E) (47)
To find an upper bound for H(Vr|E, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ):
H(Vr|E, Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) =
1∑
i=0
P (E = i)H(Vr|E = i, Vm, UFm , ZN1 )
= P (E = 1)H(Vr|E = 1, Vm, UFm , ZN1 )
+(1− P (E = 1))× 0
→ H(Vr|E, Vm, UFm , ZN1 )
= P (E = 1)H(Vr|E = 1, Vm, UFm , ZN1 )
≤ P (E = 1)H(Vr) = Pe|Aw|
(48)
Considering (47) and (48):
H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 ) ≤ H(E) + Pe|Aw| (49)
→ H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 )/N ≤
1
N
(H(E) + Pe|Aw|) (50)
→ H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 )/N
≤ 1N (H(2−N
β
) + 2−N
β |Aw|) (51)
→ lim
N→∞
H(Vr|Vm, UFm , ZN1 )/N
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N (H(2
−Nβ ) + 2−N
β |Aw|) (52)
= lim
N→∞
2−N
β
I(Ww) = 0 (53)
Considering lemma 4.1 and (39):
1
N
I(M ;ZN1 |UFm) ≤ I(Ww)− |Aw|/N
N→∞≈ 0 (54)
Therefore, the security of coding scheme is proved, since
lim
N→∞
I(M ;Z)/N is equivalent to lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z)/k. Equation
(54) holds since I(Ww)
N→∞≡ |Aw|/N .
V. EXTENDING PROOFS TO THE WHOLE
CAPACITY-EQUIVOCATION REGION
In this section we show that for the proposed scheme the
equivocation rate approaches its upper bound for rates higher
than secrecy capacity Cs. According to (10), for rates higher
that Cs, and for binary-input nonsymmetric channels the upper
bound for equivocation rate equals Cs = IWm − IWw . We
expand I(XN1 ,M ;Z
N
1 ) in two forms:
I(XN1 ,M ;Z
N
1 |UFm) = I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)
+I(M ;ZN1 |XN1 , UFm) (55)
= I(M ;ZN1 |UFm) + I(XN1 ;ZN1 |M,UFm) (56)
In (55) I(M ;ZN1 |XN1 , UFm) equals to zero (M → X → Y →
Z). From (55) and (56):
I(M ;ZN1 |UFm) = I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)
−I(XN1 ;ZN1 |M,UFm) (57)
Equivocation rate H(M |ZN1 , UFm)/N is expanded as follow-
ing equations:
H(M |ZN1 , UFm)
N
=
H(M |UFm)− I(M ;ZN1 |UFm)
N
= (58)
7H(M |UFm) + I(XN1 ;ZN1 |M,UFm)− I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)
N
(59)
(59) concluded using (58) and (57). From (59):
H(M |UFm)/N +H(XN1 |M,UFm)/N
−H(XN1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm)/N − I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)/N (60)
H(M,XN1 |UFm)/N −H(XN1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm)/N
−I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)/N (61)
H(XN1 |UFm)/N −H(XN1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm)/N
−I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)/N (62)
≥ |Am|
N
− H(X
N
1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm)
N
− IWw (63)
Equation (62) is derived from the Markov chain M → U →
X → (Y,Z). (63) follows from I(XN1 ;ZN1 |UFm)/N ≤ IWw
and H(XN1 |UFm)/N = |Am|/N .
Inequality I(XN1 ;Z
N
1 |UFm)/N ≤ IWw holds:
I(XN1 ;Z
N
1 |UFm) = H(ZN1 |UFm)−H(ZN1 |XN1 , UFm)
= H(ZN1 |UFm)−
N∑
i=1
H(Zi|Xi, UFm)
≤∑ (H(Zi|UFm)−H(Zi|Xi, UFm))
=
N∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|UFm) ≤ NI(Ww)
(64)
H(XN1 |UFm)/N = |Am|/N holds since transmitted code-
words are uniformly distributed and for specific uFm the
entropy of sequence XN1 equals to the number of good indices
for the main channel. According to analyzes:
H(M |ZN1 , UFm)/N ≥ |Am|/N
−H(XN1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm)/N − IWw (65)
Equation H(XN1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm) = H(Vr|ZN1 ,M,UFm) and
lemma 4.1 prove that there exists a sequence of frozen bits
for which the following inequality holds:
H(XN1 |ZN1 ,M,UFm) ≤ Nε (66)
Therefore,
H(M |ZN1 , UFm)/N ≥ |Am|/N − ε− IWw (67)
→ H(M |Z
N
1 )
N
≥ H(M |Z
N
1 , UFm)
N
≥ |Am|
N
− ε− IWw (68)
→ H(M |Z
N
1 )
N
≥ |Am|
N
− ε− IWw (69)
And for sufficiently large N:
Lim
N→∞
H(M |ZN1 )
N
= IWm − IWw (70)
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section results for calculation of equivocation at Eve
are presented to support the theoretic proofs. We show that the
equivocation rate achieves its upper bound for all rates. First,
equivocation at Eve H(M |ZN ) has been introduced. Then,
results has been presented. In all the settings, message has
uniform distribution and both main and wiretap channels are
BEC. BEC channels are of great interest since there are recur-
sive equations to calculate the Bhattacharrya parameter [13].
A. Equivocation at Eve
The measure for security is I(M ;ZN )/N . It is expanded
to:
I(M ;ZN )
N
=
H(M)
N
− H(M |Z
N )
N
(71)
=
k
N
− H(M |Z
N )
N
= R− H(M |Z
N )
N
(72)
To derive I(M ;ZN )/N , calculating H(M |ZN ) is sufficient.
We propose the following lemma which is an extension to [20]
Lemma 4.1.
lemma 6.1: Assume that the nested polar code is considered
P(N,A,B, uF ) (uF is a randomly chosen vector and fixed
after selecting), and B ⊂ A. HT is the parity check matrix
for overall code (P(N,A) in polar coding) and HS is the
parity check matrix for sub-code P(N,B), and channel is
BEC. Then, equivocation at Eve is calculated as following:
H(M |ZN ) = Rank(_HS(ε))−Rank(
_
HT (ε)) (73)
_
H(ε) is the matrix formed by columns of H that belong to
erased positions.
Proof.
I(M ;XN |ZN ) = H(M |ZN )−H(M |XN , ZN )
= H(XN |ZN )−H(XN |M,ZN )
→ H(M |ZN ) = H(XN |ZN )−H(XN |M,ZN )
(74)
H(M |XN , ZN ) is equal to zero since knowing transmitted
codeword results in the message to be realized. Channels
are BEC. Therefore, for the received Z, X is explicit with
some erased symbols. Transmitted vector is built as xN =
uAGN (A) ⊕ uFGN (F). GT = GN (A ∪ Fnon−zero) is the
generator matrix of polar code formed from the rows of
the mother generator matrix GN that belongs to information
indices and nonzero positions of frozen vector. H(XN |ZN )
corresponds to overall code P(N,A), consequently for a re-
ceived Z parity check equation hold:
_
HT .(x
T
ε ) = 0. Therefore:
_
HT (ε)x
T
ε +
_
HT (ε
c)xTεc = 0 (75)
Equation (75) holds for unknown xTε .It has 2
|ε|−Rank(_HT (ε))
solutions with equal probabilities, since codewords are equal
likely. |ε| is the number of erased position. Consequently
H(X|ZN ) = |ε| −Rank(_HT (ε)).
It can also be proven that H(X|M,ZN ) = |ε| −
Rank(
_
HS(ε)). Therefore, it concludes (73).
B. Results and parity check matrix calculation
Table I presents the results of calculating equivocation rate
and normalized mutual information for εM = 0.25 and εW =
0.5, with respect to changing the rate.
The parity check matrix of any of overall codes or sub-
codes could not be calculated from the generator matrix
directly, since the generator matrix does not have a standard
form. For instance for overall code P(N,A) after elementary
row operation the generator matrix could be turn to reduced
8row echelon form and standard form of generator matrix is
derived as GT = GN (A∪Fnon−zero) = [I|A∪Fnon−zero||P1].
Then, the parity check matrix could be calculated as HT =
[P1
T |IN−|A∪Fnon−zero|].
Table I
EQUIVOCATION RATE
Rate Re = H(M |ZN )/N I(M ;ZN )/N
0.05 0.0488 0.0012
0.1 0.0988 0.0053
0.15 0.1475 0.0025
0.2 0.1992 0.0008
0.25 0.2425 0.0075
0.3 0.2480 0.052
0.4 0.2485 0.1515
0.5 0.2490 0.251
0.6 0.2492 0.3508
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we considered binary-input non-symmetric
wiretap channels. We proved that there exists a frozen vector
for which coding scheme satisfies reliability and security
conditions and also code rate achieves secrecy capacity. We
proved that the equivocation rate achieves its upper bound
for all rates in non-symmetric channels. Our results extend
to discrete memoryless channels with non-binary input. It is
proved in [21] that channels with an input alphabet of prime
size are polarized by the same transformation. If the alphabet
is not of prime size, then splitting the input alphabet into prime
subsets can solve the problem.
All the constructions in this paper are as explicit as the
polar codes since only existence of a suitable frozen vector is
proved and the method to choose it is not explored. Maurer-
Wolf [4] proved that coding schemes that satisfy the weak
security condition, can be also be converted to schemes that
satisfy the strong security condition too. This is accomplished
using information reconciliation and privacy amplification pro-
tocol [22]. Therefore, the proposed scheme could be extended
to strong security using privacy amplification protocol.
Another possible further problem to explore is to con-
struct codes when the wiretap channel is not degraded since
degradation of wiretap channel is a sufficient but not nec-
essary condition. Also, the proposed algorithm benefits from
successive cancellation decoding, which depends on the past
estimates. Therefore, if the estimates are incorrect, the error
will propagate. A decoder can be implemented to overcome
this issue. In addition, it worth investigating the possibility of
the other decoding methods, such as belief propagation [23]
and recursive-list decoding [24] being able to eliminate this
deficiency.
Recently, [25] has proposed an algorithm to overcome the
polarization restrictions. The method propose the definition of
pseudo-random frozen bits. This method can be utilized to
generalize the proposed scheme for arbitrary discrete memo-
ryless channels.
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